DEL SUJETO ONTOLÓGICO A LA AGENCIA FUNCIONAL: CRISIS ANTROPOCÉNTRICA E IMPUTACIÓN EN LA INTELIGENCIA ARTIFICIAL

The emergence of autonomous artificial intelligence poses not only a regulatory challenge but also precipitates an ontological crisis in the foundations of modern criminal law. This article offers a philosophical analysis of the «responsibility gap», construing it not as a mere technical lacuna but as a symptom of the exhaustion of the anthropocentric paradigm that anchors attribution to consciousness and metaphysical will. Engaging continental criminal law doctrine and the philosophy of technology, the study examines the limitations of traditional categories, particularly culpability and action, in the face of algorithmic opacity. As a way beyond this aporia, it provides an epistemological grounding for the category of «functional criminal agency». The article advocates a transition from a metaphysics of the subject toward a relational and systemic legal ontology, articulating a hybrid model of attribution that, through distributed responsibility, preserves liberal guarantees within a posthumanist framework.